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State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits
After Tobacco: Is the Domino Effect for
Lead Paint Manufacturers and
Others Fair Game?
Richard L. Cupp, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, I, and probably most other law school professors teaching
torts and products liability at the time, would marvel with students about how
powerfully liability claims over a single product--asbestos--influenced the tort
system and the insurance industry in the 1970s and 1980s. I would cite the
seemingly incredible statistic that by 1992 $12 billion dollars had been spent
litigating and paying asbestos claims.' I would point out that asbestos claims were
so pervasive that they skewed statistics on tort litigation, encouraging a perception
that injury lawsuits were skyrocketing out of control across the board.' I would
note theories that this $12 billion dollars of asbestos litigation alone was largely
responsible for a serious insurance crisis in the 1980s.' I would recount the manner
in which advocates of legislative restrictions on tort recoveries used asbestos
litigation as their battle cry due to the enormity of its size and scope.'
All of this over 12 billion dollars. That is $3 billion less than the state of
Texas alone garnered as its share of the states' 1998 settlement with tobacco
*. Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. See Michael Schachner, Asbestos Fund Proposed: Keen Plan Would Bar Torts Suits, Punitive
Damages, Bus. INs., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1; Ronald E. Yates, CNA Subsidiary Agrees to Asbestos
Settlement Effort, CHi. TRIB., April 13, 1993, at 3.
2. Asbestos claims accounted for 75 percent of the increase in products liability lawsuit filings
from 1981 through 1988. See Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Consumer Protection and Competitiveness, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, United States General Accounting Office, Jan. 1988.
3. See Christopher Farrell, The Crisis is Over-But Insurance Will Never Be the Same, Bus. WK.,
May 25, 1987, at 122.
4. See, e.g., Joanne Wojcik, U.S. Liability System: Stopping Innovation or Promoting Safety?,
Bus. INs., Aug. 23, 1993, at 3 (quoting defense attorney arguing that asbestos and other mass torts have
caused a crisis and that tort reform is needed).
companies.' The total amount of the settlement was $246 billion-more than twenty
times the amount spent on the asbestos claims that previously impressed so many
observers as an overwhelming sum of money.6
If asbestos litigation so powerfully influenced the tort system, the insurance
industry, and political discourse, it is difficult to imagine how significant the $246
tobacco settlement will be in bringing about change. I now tell my students that at
the end of their careers, thirty or forty years from now, they will still be working
through the implications of this decade's tobacco litigation.
Ironically, this monumental transfer of wealth comes at a time when civil
plaintiffs generally are facing increasing obstacles to winning judgments. Backed
by powerful lobbying from the insurance industry and manufacturers, tort reform
began sweeping the nation twenty years ago, and now virtually every state has
enacted laws designed to make recovering tort judgments more difficult, and to
reduce the amount awarded.' Although not all courts have enthusiastically
welcomed tort reform,8 the judiciary has been even less friendly to tort plaintiffs
in the 1980s and 1990s. Even conservative scholars acknowledge that the courts
have pulled back substantially from their expansionist tendencies in the 1960s and
1970s, and thatjudicially imposed restrictions have made recovery by tort plaintiffs
much more difficult.9 The increasing restrictions include limitations on class
actions-an effective vehicle for tobacco litigation and one that litigants will likely
utilize in the wave of analogous litigation that will follow the successes against
tobacco.l1
Jurors also are perceived as more anti-plaintiff than in an earlier era. Intense
publicity about the social costs of litigation and the asserted torts "crisis" has found
its mark. Whereas a typical juror twenty years ago may have associated sympathet-
ically with the plaintiff as an underdog victimized by an impersonal, unfeeling
corporate defendant, today that same juror might suspect that the plaintiff is trying
to milk the system, and that awarding money to the plaintiff will contribute to
5. See Editorial, Texas, Flush With a Surplus, Should Adequately Fund CHIP, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 18, 1998, at 4B.
6. See Mark Curriden, Fresh Off Tobacco Success, State Ags Seek Next Battle; United Front Puts
Businesses on the Defensive, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 10, 1999, at IA.
7. See William Glaberson, Too Tall Tort Tales; The Real Story of the McDonalds' Coffee Victim
and Other Legal Legends, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 1999, at DI; Tort Reform is Here
to Stay, PERS. INJURY VERDICT REV., vol. 6, no. 11, May 25, 1998.
8. Prominent torts scholar and defense attorney Victor Schwartz counted 90 cases rejecting aspects
of tort reform statutes as of August, 1999. See Victor E. Schwartz, Outline, Regulation Through
Litigation: Trespass on the Separation of Powers, American Legislative Exchange Council, Disorder
in the Court Conference, Oct. 22, 1999.
9. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA'L. REV. 479, 522-43 (1990).
10. See Robert H. Klonoff & Edward K.M. Bilich, The Mass Tort Class Action Gamble,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., August, 1999, at 8. The authors note that restrictions on class actions
are most pronounced in the federal courts, and that plaintiffs are increasingly seeking class action relief
in state courts. See id.
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higher prices for products and higher insurance rates.
At least prior to the tobacco settlement, this pro-defense trend in tort law
revealed itself in lowering insurance rates. Although little noted in the media -
particularly when contrasted with the attention paid to rises in insurance rates in the
1970s and 1980s - business insurance rates dropped seven percent overall from
1985 to 1991. " Between 1986 and 1996, the average product manufacturer spent
only 16 cents on products liability insurance for every $100 of merchandise sold. 2
Thus, the torts landscape presents a picture comparatively favorable to
defendants in most respects, but featuring truly enormous spikes in select mass
torts claims. Indeed, the enormity of the tobacco settlement is such that it alone far
outweighs the general decline in most areas of tort law. Cognizant of the
unprecedented opportunities potentially offered by litigation modeled after the
tobacco lawsuits, and the lessening of opportunities in other areas, elite plaintiffs'
lawyers will focus powerfully in coming years on generating mass tort claims
analogous to tobacco litigation. The power and moral authority of state and local
governments will aid them in a newly emerging alliance.
H1. THE NEW POWER BROKERS-STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND THE
PLAINTIFFS' BAR ELITE
Emboldened by their phenomenal success with tobacco litigation, in June,
1999 fifty state attorneys general held a strategy session at Nashville's Opryland
Hotel to discuss future targets.' 3 Such meetings are likely to continue far into the
future; part of the 1998 tobacco settlement included a payment of $50 million into
an enforcement fund for the National Association of Attorneys General
("NAAG")."' Even if these funds are not directly used for planning lawsuits
against other industries, they add another incentive to replicate the success of the
tobacco settlement.
The state attorneys general do not perceive themselves as greedy or anti-
business. Rather, they believe they are filling a gap in consumer protection created
by reduced spending on enforcement by federal regulatory agencies. 5 However,
11. See Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi, Insurance Market Responses to the 1980s Liability
Reforms: An Analysis of Firm-Level Data, 61 J. RISK & INS. 192, 216 (1994).
12. See Robert J. Hunter, Consumer Federation of America, Product Liability Insurance: A Report
of the Insurance Group of Consumer Federation of America
5(1998).
13. See Curriden, supra note 6.
14. See Samuel Goldreich, Small Farmers Stand Against Big Tobacco's Settlement; $246 Billion
Deal Burns Independent Growers, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at Dl 1.
15. See id.
two powerful byproducts of the tobacco settlement--a great deal of money and a
successful modus operandi to utilize in future litigation--may well lead to
significant overkill.
Regarding money, the $50 million awarded directly to NAAG, although
noteworthy, is a relatively minor issue. Much more important is the political payoff
of earning billions of dollars for their states' coffers, and the billions of dollars
earned by the private attorneys representing the states. Many state attorneys
general have, of course, higher political aspirations. Successfully waging battle
against a corporate pariah like the tobacco industry, and winning huge sums of
money to be spent on social programs, was a substantial political victory. The
drive to repeat this political success will be strong, perhaps for many irresistible.
The attorneys who successfully represented the states will desire to repeat their
victory as well. By operating on a contingency fee basis in most instances, they
earned billions of dollars in the tobacco settlement.16 The enormity of this payoff
will enable these lawyers to invest in future political campaigns at an
unprecedented level. They will doubtless invest in politicians perceived as
sympathetic to state mass tort actions and other pro-plaintiff positions, including
the very attorneys general who hired them to represent the states.
This marriage of political and financial interests between the state attorneys
general and the lawyers they hired in the tobacco lawsuits should create a potent
political force that will press for further expansion of public interest state mass tort
actions. In a sense, it is the mirror image of the political and financial forces that
have contributed to the tort reform movement in recent years. Similar to the
manner in which the political popularity of attacking lawsuits complements the
financial contributions by insurers and corporations to pro-reform politicians, the
popularity of protecting consumers (or at least the perception of protecting them)
will combine with campaign contribution rewards for pursuing state mass tort
actions. Absent a shift in public opinion, the proliferation of such lawsuits seems
likely.
Some observers do not lament this development, but rather view it as a leveling
of the playing field with pro-business campaign donors.17 However, others decry
the potential for graft that arises when lawyers represent the state on extremely
lucrative terms and then make large campaign contributions to the officials who
hire them. Of particular concern is that many of the state attorneys general hired
16. For example, the law firm of famous plaintiffs' lawyer Peter G. Angelos is fighting for an
approximately $1 billion fee from the state of Maryland's tobacco settlement alone. See Daniel LeDuc,
Angelos, Maryland Feud Over Tobacco Fee, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1999, at B 1. Maryland's share of
the joint tobacco settlement is over $4 billion. See id. This is not an isolated situation. The lawyers
who represented Massachusetts, for example, are claiming more than $2 billion in fees. See Brian
Adae, Trial Lawyers' Taxation by Litigation, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Sept. 26, 1999, at 6K.
17. See David Rubenstein, The Rules Have Changed, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July, 1999, at 43 ("It
should be noted that some proponents of this arrangement see it as a perfect melding of interests in a
society where free-market economics is the only game in town, and reformists who don't figure out how
to play that game are destined to whither on the vine of altruism and protest.").
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their lawyers through back-room deals, rather than through open bidding. As
asserted by torts scholar and defense lawyer Victor Schwartz, a prominent critic of
the class actions: "It's not rocket science. If the state is hiring a contingency fee
lawyer with no open process, and with potentially not millions, but billions of
dollars involved, the opportunity for something to go awry is significant.
Especially in states with loose rules on political contributions."' 8
In addition to the influence of money, the development of a highly successful
modus operandi will play a powerful role in encouraging more state mass tort
actions. One of the keys to the states' success was combining their efforts. Even
when acting alone, a state seeking reimbursement for medicare expenditures has
greater litigation resources and moral authority than is typically present in mass tort
actions initiated by private attorneys. When large numbers of states combine to
bring such actions, their resources and moral authority are even more powerful.
Suing as a governmental entity seeking reimbursement also provided tactical
advantages that may be replicated in future lawsuits. For example, one of the major
attractions of using the states as plaintiffs in the tobacco lawsuits was their
softening of manufacturers' powerful assumption of risk arguments. Since the
states did not themselves choose to smoke, but rather were seeking reimbursement
for medical costs expended in treating resident smokers, assumption of risk
arguments became one step removed from their prominent position in lawsuits
brought directly by smokers. 9 Lawsuits brought by states rather than individuals
may also allow for looser causation rulings, particularly regarding the use of
statistical evidence.2" Further, the states can coordinate legal strategies to maximize
their effectiveness. For example, state A might be designated to be the first to
forward an innovative legal position in its lawsuit. If the court hearing state A's
case rejects the position, the other states gain the benefit of seeing the defendant's
response to the position, as well as a court's response. The other states can then
fine-tune their position or their briefing accordingly.
Perhaps even more frightening for corporations are the enormous legal fees
and the possibility of astronomically large judgments when several of the states
join to pursue them. For example, if multi-billion dollar judgments had been
entered against tobacco manufacturers in the states' lawsuits, the manufacturers
likely would have lacked the resources to immediately pay the judgments (or even
18. Id.
19. Professor Frank Vandall and others presaged the states' tobacco lawsuits with a law review
article promoting this advantage in 1994. See Raymond E. Gangarosa, Frank J. Vandall, & Brian M.
Willis, Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and
Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 81 (1994).
20. See State of New Mexico Fights "Remoteness" Arguments, MEALEY's LITIG. REP., Oct. 1,
1998.
689
post an appeal bond), and may have been forced into bankruptcy.2" Faced with this
possibility, a huge settlement paid out over time made sense.
Indeed, the states' combined litigation muscle, moral authority, and potential
for winning overwhelming judgments gives them so much power that they would
likely be able to extract large settlements even when their underlying legal claims
are questionable. The states' prospects for winning most of their tobacco lawsuits
at trial, for example, was far from certain--on several grounds it seemed likelier that
most of the lawsuits would ultimately be dismissed or rejected byjuries. However,
despite enjoying a relatively strong legal position, the strain of litigation, public
pressure, and the possibility of bankruptcy if many of the lawsuits prevailed, forced
the tobacco companies to come to the table with their precedent-dwarfing
settlement.
Because of tobacco manufacturers' well-documented misdeeds, many might
be understandably disinclined to shed tears over their predicament. However, as
the states move on to other mass tort claims, many other industries with less
extreme or less clear-cut misconduct may become caught in the same trap.
Governmental litigation against firearms manufacturers and lead paint producers
has already begun. Some of the industries discussed in the media as additional
potential post-tobacco targets include alcohol producers, health insurers,
prescription drug manufacturers, nursing home operators, sweepstakes distributors,
car rental companies, gambling establishments, and fast food restaurants serving
fatty foods. Even if the claims that might be made against this wide range of
industries could not ultimately be established in court, each of the industries may
well feel compelled to pay large settlements if confronted with the states' collective
strength.
Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, recognizing the potential far-
reaching effect of such lawsuits, has approvingly labeled this the beginning of an
era of "regulation through litigation."22 Criticism of such a development often
focuses on the separation of powers problem arising when courts become involved
in public policy.23 However, the states' potential to extract huge payments even
when defendants could not be adjudicated legally liable, combined with the state
officers' political and economic incentives to do so, presents equally if not more
troubling concerns.
21. Even class actions brought by private attorneys could win billions of dollars and bankrupt
manufacturers. See Thomas S. Mulligan & Myron Levin, Investors are Swearing Off Tobacco Firms;
Securities, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 23, 1999, at C I (quoting a tobacco litigation expert as predicting
there is "a very substantial likelihood that these companies are going to be at the mercy of a bankruptcy
judge in a few months").
22. See Robert B. Reich, Regulation is Out, Litigation is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 15A.
23. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Turning Lead Into Gold, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23 & 30, 1999, at 21
("[A] threat to the rule of law is that many states and cities are resorting to government-sponsored
litigation to achieve what they could not do through the legislative process, thus violating the principle
of separation of powers - a centerpiece of the federal constitution and no less important at the state
level.").
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Ill. THE NEXT STEP-LEAD PAINT MANUFACTURERS AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE
TARGET
The old adage "bad facts make bad law" seems to apply well to the states'
tobacco litigation. Because the tobacco manufacturers acted so badly, and because
their unpopularity crested (perhaps appropriately) at such a high level, the state
attorneys general, as well as some courts and legislatures, forced an unhealthy pace
of policy and legal evolution in the struggle to prevail against the industry. This
Part addresses claims against the lead paint industry as an illustration of the
"copycat" suits that will seek to repeat the successes against tobacco. In addition
to introducing claims against the lead paint industry, this Part analyzes similarities
and differences between these claims and the lawsuits against the tobacco industry.
The lead paint industry may or may not be saintly, but from present
appearances it has not engaged in misconduct as serious as the blatant lies and
fraud that seemed pervasive in the tobacco industry. However, the lead paint
industry, along with future targets, will inherit the consequences of the tobacco
industries' misdeeds, and may be forced to pay enormous tributes to the states even
if its members have done nothing wrong. 4
Of all of the state mass tort lawsuits being discussed following the tobacco
settlement, claims against manufacturers of lead-based paint may be the most
closely analogous. They also appear, along with claims against firearms
manufacturers, to be gaining the most momentum in the wake of the states' tobacco
litigation.
In September, 1999 two lawsuits-an individual action for six children and a
class action for up to one million Maryland homeowners whose homes have lead-
based paint-were filed by well-known trial attorney and Baltimore Orioles owner
Peter Angelos.25 Mr. Angelos also represented the state of Maryland in its lawsuit
against the tobacco industry; he is presently "seeking to collect fees of
approximately $1 billion from the state's settlement proceeds.26
24. As yet it is too early to argue convincingly whether the lead paint industry or other potential
targets are or are not blameworthy. The point is not whether they are to some extent blameworthy, but
rather that they may be forced to pay large settlements solely because the states decide to bring their
potentially bankrupting collective power against the industries, regardless of whether the industries are
blameworthy, and regardless of how serious their potential blameworthiness might be.
25. See Scott Shane, A Child's Suffering Puts Lead on Trial; Paint Poisoning Suit Seeks
Compensation for Baltimore Family, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 27, 1999, at LA.
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
In October 1999, the state of Rhode Island also filed a lawsuit against lead
paint and lead pigment manufacturers.27 Rhode Island is being represented by the
law firm of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, whose principals were
also key players representing states in the tobacco litigation." As with the tobacco
litigation, the law firm is representing the state on a contingency fee basis.2 9
Perhaps stung by criticism of the multi-billion dollar fees earned in the tobacco
cases, in the Rhode Island lead paint litigation the lawyers have publicly announced
that they will work for half of their normal contingency fee rate.3° Similar to the
tobacco lawsuits, Rhode Island's claim seeks reimbursement for state money spent
treating victims of lead paint poisoning, as well as funds for an abatement and
education program and punitive damages. 3
As of November 1999, Washington State and Missouri were reportedly on the
verge of filing similar lawsuits, and California is also contemplating an action.32
The tobacco litigation began in a similar manner, with a few states filing early
claims, and more states gradually adding on as it became clearer that a substantial
victory was likely. Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Senator, was as of February 2000
drafting legislation that would give the federal government authority to recover
costs related to lead paint injuries.3
Lead paint is highly toxic when ingested or inhaled. It is particularly
dangerous to children, frequently causing brain and nerve damage, among other
ailments.34 Lead paint poisoning is particularly common in decaying urban areas,
where buildings are likelier to feature crumbling lead-based paints. Children are
most frequently exposed by putting paint chips in their mouths (the lead-based
paint is reportedly as "sweet as candy")35 or by inhaling lead paint dust.36
The Rhode Island lawsuit alleges a history of early discovery of dangers and
subsequent cover-ups that are reminiscent of those that so severely impaired the
tobacco industry's ability to defend itself. As early as 1904, before it began
manufacturing lead paints, Sherwin-Williams published an article warning of lead
paint's dangers.37 As knowledge of the dangers spread, other countries began
27. See Rhode Island Dep't of Att'y Gen. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n,
<www.riag.state.ri.us/press/0ct99/complaint.html>; see also Henry Weinstein, Rhode Island Sues 8
Firms Over Health Effects of Lead-Based Paint, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A18.
28. See Weinstein, supra note 27, at A18.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Rhode Island Dep't of Att'y Gen. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, supra note 27.
32. See Levy, supra note 23 ("Washington State and Missouri [are] waiting in the wings"); Henry
Weinstein, supra note 27 ("Among those considering suit is California Atty. Gen. Bill Lockyer...").
33. See Emerging Toxic Torts: Bill Would Let Government Sue Lead Pigment Makers, MEALEY'S
LITIG. REP., Nov. 3, 1999.
34. See Rhode Island Dep't of Att'y Gen. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, supra note 27, 18.
35. See Milo Geyelin, Former Makers of Lead Paint are Sued by Rhode Island for Child Health
Costs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1999.
36. See id.
37. See Rhode Island Dep't of Att'y Gen. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, supra note 27, 1 21.
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banning lead paints in the 1920s." However, according to Rhode Island's lawyers,
the lead paint and pigment industry engaged in a decades long campaign to fend off
legislative restrictions on their products. They allegedly successfully lobbied state
and federal regulators to avoid having to remove the product from the market or
even to provide warnings. 9
The manufacturers also distributed advertisements to the public portraying lead
paint as safe. A few of the quotations from advertising publications cited in the
Rhode Island complaint include "lead helps to guard your health," "[a lead paint
formula] makes a good heavy body paint suitable [for use in nurseries]," and "a
safe, time-tested paint."
Allegedly because of the pressure placed on regulators, lead paint continued
to be produced and widely purchased in the United States through most of the
twentieth century. Interior use of lead paints ended in the 1950s, but use of
exterior lead paints was not banned until 1978.41
Approximately 64 million buildings in the United States feature at least some
lead-based paint.42 The problem is especially severe in older buildings, particularly
in decaying urban areas where paint is likelier to be both old and peeling. Low
income children are eight times more likely to suffer lead poisoning from paint than
high income children, and African-American children are five times more likely to
be victims than are white children.
43
Rhode Island and other states suing lead paint manufacturers may have
difficulty proving which specific manufacturer made the paint that injured
particular persons because the paint is often similar or identical. However, they
will likely attempt to pin liability on the entire industry through a market share
approach to causation. In successful uses of the controversial market share
approach, liability is divided between all defendant manufacturers based on their
market share at the time the product was sold." Earlier decisions have declined to
use market share causation in lead paint cases.4 However, recently a court refused
to reject use of market share causation in a lead paint case filed by New York
38. See Shane, supra note 25.
39. See Rhode Island Dep't of Att'y Gen. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, supra note 27, 39.
40. Id., 31.
41. See Geyelin, supra note 35.
42. See Shane, supra note 25.
43. See Weinstein, supra note 27.
44. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (applying market share
causation to manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES)).
45. See Geyelin, supra note 35. Rhode Island is seeking to distinguish its case from earlier failed
attempts to utilize market share causation based on its status as a government entity. See id.
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City.46 Although the issue is still being litigated in the New York City case, the
court's refusal to reject market share causation thus far may indicate a willingness
to allow relaxed causation standards when such cases are pursued by government
entities.
A. Some Similarities Between Lead Paint Claims and Tobacco Claims
Briefly analyzing some similarities and differences between the claims against
the lead paint industry and the tobacco industry may help to predict directions the
lead paint litigation might lead, and may help evaluate whether a result similar to
the tobacco settlement is appropriate. First, some similarities:
1. Allegations of Failing to Warn and Active Concealment of Serious
Health Risks
The crux of the lead paint lawsuits is, at least at surface, closely analogous to
the most damaging allegations against the tobacco industry. Just as the tobacco
industry failed to warn and concealed information about the risks of smoking, the
lead industry allegedly failed to warn and concealed information about the risks of
lead. If these allegations against the lead paint industry prove true, their impact
will likely correlate with the seriousness of the industry's misconduct. The more
blatant and bold-faced their misdeeds, the more closely analogous their position
will be to tobacco. Indeed, many observers argue that the degree of deception
practiced by the tobacco industry was the biggest factor in its legal downfall.47
Although it is much too early to predict with certainty where the facts will
lead, at present the deception allegations against the lead paint industry appear
milder than those leveled at the tobacco industry. Although the industry portrayed
lead paint as basically safe, it apparently acknowledged that lead could cause
serious injuries if ingested. This seems less serious than the tobacco industry's
misrepresentations, such as its bald denial that any link had been proven between
smoking and cancer.
2. Combined Efforts of Several States
As with the tobacco litigation, it appears that several states will eventiallyjoin
together in their pursuit of the lead paint industry. In addition to Washington State,
Missouri, and possibly California," numerous other states and cities will be
46. See City of New York v. Lead.Indus. Ass'n, 1999 WL 1259852, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 99577
(N.Y. Sept. 1999).
47. See, e.g., David Rubenstein, Lessons Learned From the Tobacco Wars, CORP. LEGAL TIMES,
July 1999, at 43 (citing experts who believe "deception is a key element in the case against tobacco").
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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pressured to join the battle by the political and economic forces addressed above.
Further, if additional damning evidence comes to light, if public opinion focuses
negatively on the lead paint industry, or if it begins to appear likely that a
substantial settlement is imminent, states will experience even more incentive to
become involved. As addressed above, their combined litigation muscle, moral
authority, and potential for forcing huge legal expenses and a huge recovery would
likely compel a settlement even if the cases lack merit.
3. Representation by Private Lawyers on a Contingency Fee
Rhode Island's retention of private attorneys on a contingency fee basis is an
important similarity with the tobacco litigation. As with the tobacco litigation, it
means that the state is not gambling any of its own money. This allows the
Attorney General to avoid going to the legislature to seek funding, and may have
been a factor in filing the lawsuit since there is, at least financially, nothing to lose.
It is also significant in that the contingency fee lawyers could earn huge fees in the
litigation, even at half their normal rate.49 Since the same attorneys represented
states in the tobacco litigation, an appearance could arise that the political influence
they gained from becoming such powerful potential campaign contributors helped
encourage the state's officials to proceed with the lawsuit. Further, if the attorneys
obtain a large fee, the money could enhance their political ability to encourage
other such lawsuits in the future.
4. Allegations of Inadequate Legislative Response
A final similarity is that both the tobacco litigation and the lead paint litigation,
have featured allegations that the states' legislatures were not active enough in
controlling the industry's misconduct. Attempting to precisely define an
appropriate public policy role for civil courts is difficult. Relying on public policy
concerns is to some extent inevitable in judicial decision-making, but legislatures
must have primacy in the policy arena. However, when courts perceive that the
legislature cannot or will not take on a policy issue, the courts are less hesitant to
address it themselves."0 This may have emboldened some courts to take a more
active policy role in the tobacco litigation, and, if the criticism is perceived as valid
with regard to lead paint, may embolden some courts to engage in more policy-
49. For example, if the lawyers' normal contingency rate were 40 percent, but they reduced it to 20
percent for this case, they would still earn $200 million on a judgment or settlement of $1 billion.
50. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 845, 877-88
(arguing that judicial reform of successor liability rules is preferable to waiting for legislative reform,
in part because a legislative response faces practical barriers).
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making in that litigation as well.
B. Differences Between Tobacco Claims and Lead Paint Claims
1. Size of Potential Settlement or Judgment
The lead paint litigation will not likely be as large as the states' tobacco
settlement. Tobacco has of course caused death and disease on a scale that is,
fortunately, unlikely to be rivaled by any other products, with the possible
exception of alcohol,5 in the foreseeable future. Although lead paint poisoning has
harmed millions of people,52 tobacco is one of the major causes of death in the
United States. However, noting that the lead paint litigation will be smaller than
the tobacco litigation is much different from classifying it as small. To account for
medical expenses, abatement costs, and possible punitive damages, a settlement or
judgment could easily range into the billions of dollars. Remember that the $12
billion spent in asbestos litigation through 1992 shook the courts and the insurance
industry. 3 The lead paint litigation could also have a significant societal impact,
particularly if it is only one of several state mass tort claims in the coming years.
2. Assumption of Risk
Tobacco manufacturers have a strong assumption of risk argument because
smokers willingly choose to smoke. Even in the. state tobacco lawsuits, where
assumption of risk was one step removed because the states were suing on behalf
of smokers,54 assumption of risk concerns likely would have influenced juror
deliberations had the cases gone to trial. The assumption of risk issue seems much
less significant in lead paint litigation. Perhaps defendants could argue that
homeowners who let their paint decay to the point of peeling are at least partially
at fault;55 however, unlike tobacco, many homeowners likely do not know that the
paint on their house is dangerous. Further, the victims of lead paint are most
frequently children, who have nothing to do with selecting the paint or maintaining
51. Although alcohol consumption is associated with lower levels of addiction than cigarette
addiction, the consequences of alcoholism may be perceived as even worse. To illustrate this, imagine
if a person were forced to choose between their child being addicted to alcohol or addicted to tobacco.
Most would likely choose tobacco.
52. The Centers for Disease Control indicates that presently "nearly one million American children
five and under have elevated levels of lead in their blood." See Michael Raganelli, Understanding The
Lead Paint Issue, NEW YORK POST, Feb. 20, 1998, at 059. Not all persons with elevated levels of lead
in their blood experience adverse effects.
53. See supra notes 1 through 4 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
55. See Levy, supra note 23 (arguing that the blame for lead paint injuries should be placed on "the
owners of aging homes, who should have maintained them more diligently").
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it. In this regard, lead paint claims seem to have an advantage over tobacco claims.
3. Publicity and Public Sentiment
Unlike the tobacco industry, presently there is no pervasively negative
publicity or widespread public hatred of the lead paint industry. Tobacco
manufacturers' unpopularity was likely a significant factor in creating the
momentum for the states to pursue them, and may have been the states' best hope
for victory had the cases gone to trial. However, with an established modus
operandi, coupled with political and economic incentives to bring more mass tort
actions, it remains to be seen whether widespread public hatred will be a necessary
ingredient in lead paint claims and other mass tort claims. Further, if enough states
join the lead paint litigation, publicity about the industry's alleged fraud and other
misdeeds is sure to intensify. By the time the cases settle or go to trial, public
opinion could be more firmly set against lead paint manufacturers than it is at
present.
4. Children as Primary Victims
A final dissimilarity is that smokers typically suffer injuries as adults, but
victims of lead poisoning typically suffer their injuries as children. The Rhode
Island lawsuit seeks to capitalize on the emotional pull of protecting children,
entitling part of its complaint a request for Equitable Relief to Protect Children."56
Tobacco claims come closest to this in the allegations that the industry directed
advertising toward children. Although those allegations have evoked a strong
reaction from much of society, allegations of serious injury inflicted directly upon
children might evoke even stronger sympathies in lead paint litigation.
IV. APPROPRIATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Many legislators and others make passionate arguments that states' mass tort
lawsuits infringe on the legislatures' policy-making and taxation role.57 However,
the fact that the issue is attracting attention and arousing vigorous public debate
should--at least in long term perspective-- lessen these fears. The more the concern
56. See Rhode Island Dep't of Att'y Gen. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, supra note 27, 1 103.
57. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 23; Rubenstein, supra note 47; Prepared Statement of Sherman
Joyce, President, American Tort Reform Association Before the House Government Reform Committee,
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Subcommittee, Regulation Through Litigation,
FED. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 4, 1999; Thomas J. DiLorenzo, No Industry is Safe, NAT'L POST, Sept. 30,
1999, at C7; Adae, supra note 16; Curriden, supra note 6.
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is debated in the public arena, the more firmly its outcome ultimately rests in the
legislatures rather than the courts. Once the concern is adequately brought to
legislators' attention, they will choose to pass laws either limiting or encouraging
the lawsuits, or they will choose to do nothing. Absent undue judicial interference
with whatever action or inaction the legislatures undertake to address the problem,
increasing public attention and vigorous debate ensure that the ultimate resolution
will not have bypassed the legislative branch of government.
Having said this, the appropriate legislative response is likely to enact
legislation limiting mass tort claims by states and other government entities.
Because politics and economics may be influencing the filing of these lawsuits,
rather than a purer quest for justice, a political response is needed. Further, the
massive size of these claims and their enormous potential impact on society create
complex policy issues that are better addressed by legislatures than by courts. At
least four types of legislative responses would lessen concerns about mass tort
lawsuits filed by government entities:
A. Eliminating Contingency Fees in Lawsuits Brought by States,
Counties, and Municipalities
Contingency fee arrangements, while often a focus of criticism, play an
important role in providing broad and fair access to the courts. Individuals who
could not afford to pay a lawyer's hourly rate5" are enabled to seekjustice through
paying their lawyer a percentage of their judgment or settlement. However, states,
counties, and municipalities have sufficient resources to hire attorneys, or use their
own, if they feel that a tort lawsuit is sufficiently meritorious. Barring them from
entering contingency fee arrangements with lawyers would not limit access to the
courts, but it would force government officials to obtain funding before filing
lawsuits. Ultimately this would empower legislatures, who hold the states' purse-
strings. Paying an hourly rate would also significantly reduce the problem of
plaintiffs' lawyers gaining a huge windfall on such cases, and then reinvesting
large sums as political contributions. Although buying influence, or at least access,
through political contributions is not at all unique to trial lawyers, unique concerns
arise from using political contributions to purchase, in effect, a legal prosecution.
698
58. This includes, of course, most of us. At the large firm where I practiced law before moving to
teaching, an often-noted irony among the well-paid attorneys was that if any of us as individuals were
in need of a lawyer, we were too expensive to afford ourselves.
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B. Enacting a Loser Pays Rule Limited to Government Tort Lawsuits
The often discussed loser pays rule carries with it a significant concern in most
applications; it heavily favors corporations and other insured entities over
individual plaintiffs. For example, if an opponent's legal fees total $100,000, being
forced to pay this amount would be an inconvenience for a large corporation, but
might mean bankruptcy for a typical individual. Thus, the loser pays rule would
deter plaintiffs from bringing frivolous lawsuits, but it would also encourage
corporations to maintain frivolous defenses rather than paying legitimate claims.
However, states and other government entities would occupy a more even playing
field with corporate defendants if legislatures enacted a loser pays rule limited to
government tort lawsuits. Creating such a law would cause states to think carefully
before filing questionable lawsuits, and it would encourage truly culpable corporate
defendants to capitulate quickly rather than be forced to pay the state's attorneys
fees in protracted litigation.59
C. Require Open and Competitive Bidding for Lawyers Contracting to
Represent Government Entities in Tort Claims
Requiring open and competitive bidding for lawyers seeking contracts to
represent states in tort lawsuits would reduce concerns about campaign
contributions being used to "buy a prosecution" by the state. If contracts are
awarded privately, stronger temptations exist for state officials to reward influential
donors, and more temptations exist for trial lawyers to invest in favoritism.
Opening the bidding process to a large number of attorneys through a "Sunshine
Act ' 'W would helpensure that lawsuits are brought to pursue justice rather than as
a form of political payback.
D. Make Greater Efforts at Regulation and Enforcement
As noted above, the courts' willingness to engage in public policy analysis
expands when they perceive that the legislatures cannot or will not address an
59. See Levy, supra note 23.
60. See AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, Private Attorney Retention Sunshine Act, January 1,
1999.
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issue." Thus, legislatures may control state mass tort lawsuits not only through
restrictive legislation, but also through affirmatively acting to remedy corporate
misconduct where appropriate. Critics often claim that businesses and trade
associations prevent legislatures from controlling corporate excesses through
lobbying and large campaign contributions. 62 The less a ring of truth is perceived
in such allegations, the less open courts will be to intruding on legislators' policy-
making role.
V. CONCLUSION
The massive size and scope of the states' tobacco settlement will inevitably
exert a powerful influence on tort law for decades. The proliferation of copycat
lawsuits, such as the lead paint claims, seeking to emulate the spectacular success
of the tobacco lawsuits will be one of the first aftershocks of the 1998 settlement.
The extent to which state legislatures allow these copycat lawsuits to succeed in
forcing large settlements without regard to their substantive merit will play a
significant role in determining whether, in the words of Robert Reich, we are truly
entering an era of "regulation through litigation."63
700
61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
62. The lead paint litigation is the latest example of such claims. See supra notes 37 through 39
and accompanying text.
63. See Reich, supra note 22, at 15A.
